- "Books! and what are they but the dreams of pedants? They may make a Mack, but have they ever made a Xenophon, a Caesar, a Saxe, a Frederick or a Bonaparte? Who would not laugh to hear the cobler of Athens lecturing Hannibal on the art of war?"
- "True: but as you are not Hannibal, listen to the cobler. Xenophon, Caesar, Saxe and Frederick, have all thought well of books, and have even composed them. Nor is this extraordinary, since they are but the depositories of maxims, which genius has suggested, and experience confirmed; since they both enlighten and shorten the road of the traveller, and render the labor and the genius of past ages, tributary to our own. These teach most emphatically, that the secret of successful war, is not to be found in mere legs and arms, but in the head, that shall direct them."
- see also strategy models
- Strategic Studies Institute
- Strategic Theory for the 21st Century: the Little Book on Big Strategy, by Yarger, The Letort Papers, Feb 2006
- see also Future of War for ideas on challenges the principles might face, and might need to change to handle
- see also Cebrowski and Co. re: new rules and new map of warfighting
- see also Transformation of War at Center for Transformation Studies
- see also leadership competencies and skills for ideas on what principles will take advantage of the leadership skills of the future
- Perceived Worthiness
- Informed Insight
- Strategic Anchoring
- Durability
- Engagement Dominance
- Unity of Effect
- Adaptability
- Culminating Power
- Future Warfare: Rethinking the Principles of War - project by the Office of Force Transformation (OFT)
-
Have the Principles of War changed? Some think it is an interesting question, and to that end we have put together a team to examine this subject. The group includes the Office of Force Transformation, the U.S. Naval Institute, the Royal Uniformed Services Institute, and Johns Hopkins University. In search of the answer, this group is hosting a summer seminar series followed by a national essay contest to produce a textbook on this subject.
- Speakers bios, notes, etc. from the seminar above, at Johns Hopkins University
- What Do We Know About Future Warfare? - 15 March 2005 notes by Dr Colin Gray
- Malignants in the Body Politic: Redefining War through Metaphor, SAAS paper, 2004
- Purpose: discuss concept elements which are missing or not fully developed in current JOpsC family of concepts
- Agenda
- Freedom of Action
- Dimensions of Competition
- Fires & Maneuver
- Principles of War - several good slides about issues, shortfalls, & changes needed
- Legitimacy
- Definitions
- Principles of Transformation
- Sense-Making
- Rethinking the Principles of War, by Morgan, McIvor, and SecNav Action Team, in Proceedings, Oct 2003
- Principles of War on the Network-Centric Battlefield: Mass and Economy of Force, by Murdock, in Parameters, Spring 2002
- Principles of War for the Battlefield of the Future, by Schneider, in Battlefield of the Future: 21st Century Warfare Issues
- The Information-Based RMA and the Principles of War, by Litton, in Air & Space Power Chronicles - includes discussion of six of the traditional principles which may be influenced most by the emergence of information-based warfare
- Sailing New Seas, by Reason and Freymann, Newport Paper No. 13
- Appendix A - Fighting Principles
-
"There are no new principles of war. However, different principles should receive different emphases in different environments. Some are especially appropriate to the Navy's current environment. This appendix highlights a few of those principles."
-
The new principles of war are no longer "using armed force to compel the enemy to submit to one's will," but rather are "using all means…to compel the enemy to accept one's interests. - from Unrestricted Warfare, by Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui
- Leonhard criticizes the traditional nine principles and proposes seven new ones
- knowledge and ignorance,
- dislocation and confrontation,
- distribution and concentration,
- opportunity and reaction,
- activity and security,
- option acceleration and objective, and
- command and anarchy
- Appendix A - Fighting Principles
- A Fresh Look at Some Old Principles-Building a Framework for the Twenty-First Century, by Heinz, Naval War College paper - expands on Leonhard book above
- framework based on the independent Law of Humanity and the dependent Laws of Risk, Adaptability, and Duality of War
- new principles of war - Comparative vs. Exclusive Advantage, Knowledge vs. Estimates, Confrontation vs. Dislocation, Concentration vs. Distribution, Reaction vs. Opportunity, Security vs. Activity, Objective vs. Option Acceleration, Anarchy vs. Command
- CADRE essays, Vol 1, including essays on characteristics, levels, human factors, tenets, etc. of war
- Principles of War, expanded description of each, in a CADRE book Air and Space Power Mentoring
Principles of War Principles of Operations
Other than WarPrinciples of Operations Objective Objective Objective Offensive Perseverance Offensive Mass Legitimacy Massed Effects Economy of Force Restraint Economy of Force Maneuver - Maneuver Unity of Command Unity of Effort Unity of Effort Security Security Security Surprise - Surprise Simplicity - Simplicity - - Morale - - Exploitation Figure 1. Principles of War and Operations Other than War
(as in 1993 FM 100-5, Operations) and Principles of Operations as
proposed in Initial Draft, 1998 FM 100-5, Operations.[Ed. note: the 2004/2005 draft of Marine Small Wars manual uses the OOTW principles above, but lumps Legitimacy and Restraint together, and uses the word Persistence instead of Perseverance.]
- US Coast Guard Publication 1
- clear objective
- effective presence
- unity of effort
- on-scene initiative
- flexibility
- managed risks
- restraint
- Principles of War, by Carl von Clausewitz, full text
- International Principles of War
- Principles of War - a Translation from the Japanese, by West, Command & General Staff College
- Principles of War - a Translation from the Japanese, by West, Command & General Staff College
- see also spacepower theory at the Center for Space Studies
- AFDD 1, Chapter 3, Principles of War and Tenets of Air and Space Power
- Tenets of Air & Space Power
- Centralized Control & Decentralized Execution
- Flexibility & Versatility
- Synergistic Effects
- Persistence
- Concentration
- Priority
- Balance
- Tenets of Air & Space Power
- Airmen and Air Theory - A Review of the Sources, by Meilinger, AU Press, 2001
- Ten Propositions Regarding Spacepower, by Smith, SAAS paper, 2001
- Ten Propositions Regarding Air Power, by Meilinger, in Air & Space Power Chronicles
- (alternate source at AF History Office, big PDF file, long load time)- Whoever controls the air generally controls the surface.
- Air Power is an inherently strategic force.
- Air Power is primarily an offensive weapon.
- In essence, Air Power is targeting, targeting is intelligence, and intelligence is analyzing the effects of air operations.
- Air Power produces physical and psychological shock by dominating the fourth dimension--time.
- Air Power can conduct parallel operations at all levels of war, simultaneously.
- Precision air weapons have redefined the meaning of mass.
- Air Power's unique characteristics necessitate that it be centrally controlled by airmen.
- Technology and air power are integrally and synergistically related.
- Air Power includes not only military assets, but an aerospace industry and commercial aviation.
- Fifty Questions Every Airman Can Answer, by Baier, Air Force Doctrine Center
- 50 More Questions Every Airman Can Answer, by Baier, Air Force Doctrine Center
- Competing Theories of Airpower: a Language for Analysis, by Lt Col Faber
- see also strategic art
- Military Doctrine, by Drew and Snow, including Doctrine Tree and discussion of relationship between doctrine and strategy
- A Primer on Strategy Analysis, by Mowbray
- The Use of Military Power in Pursuit of National Interests, by Arnold, in Parameters, Spring 1994 - discusses the Nuechterlein National Interest Matrix
- In Search of the Missing Link: Relating Destruction to Outcome in Airpower Application, by Williams, 1994 SAAS paper - examines destruction-outcome linkage model as applied to strategies from WW II, Korea, Vietnam, and the 1991 Gulf War
- Towards a Theory of Strategy: Art Lykke and the Army War College Strategy Model, by Yarger
- The U.S. Army War College Methodology for Determining Interests and Levels of Intensity, by Yarger and Barber
- Aid to Formulating a Regional Strategic Appraisal, by Sadrak, Army War College
- John M. Collins, Grand Strategy: Principles and Practices. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1973
- Wylie, Joseph C. Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1989
- War, Peace, and Security Web Server, in French, from Canadian Forces College
- Air & Space Power Journal in Spanish, Portuguese, Arabic, and French
- Military Review, has Spanish, Portuguese, and Arab editions
- See list of non-English military journals on AWC Study Tips page
- AU Library Bibliographies
- Great Warrior Leaders/Thinkers, references by AU Library (selected ones below)
- Sun Tzu Bibliography, by Stein, Air War College, Nov 1999, includes other classical Chinese works [RTF file]
- Sun Tzu Bibliography, AU Library, with call numbers
- Clausewitz Bibliography, AU Library, with call numbers
- Corbett, Julian Stafford, AU Library resources
- see also international principles of war above
- see also comparisons of cultures at the culture studies center
- A Balkan Sun Tzu vs. the NATO Clausewitz: A Tentative Interpretation of the Serbo - NATO War
- War & Society, Volume 13, Number 2, October 1995, Tim Hamlett, 'Hemisphericity and Reasoning Styles in Chinese and Western Thinkers: A Comparison of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu'
- Sun Tzu and Clausewitz Compared, by Michael Handel
- Jomini and Clausewitz: Their Interaction, by Bassford, paper from meeting of Consortium on Revolutionary Europe, Ga. St. U.
- Vietnam and Desert Storm: Learning the Right Lessons from Vietnam for the Post-Cold War Era, by Col. Joseph P. Martino, USAF (Ret), incl table comparing the two wars
- Competing Theories of Airpower: a Language for Analysis, by Lt Col Faber
- Clausewitz - Eastern and Western Approaches to War, by Summers, in AU Review
- Soviet Military Theory in English, by Whiting, in AU Review, May-June 1976
- Sun Tzu Bibliography [.rtf file], by Stein, Air War College, Mar 2000, excellent annotated guide to studying Sun Tzu and related writings
- A Swift, Elusive Sword: What If Sun Tzu and John Boyd Did a National Defense Review, by Richards, at CDI
- A Balkan Sun Tzu vs. the NATO Clausewitz: A Tentative Interpretation of the Serbo - NATO War
- Sun Tzu Bibliography, AU Library, with call numbers
- Sun Tzu Art of War in Information Warfare, INSS, NDU Press
- Sun Tzu On the Art of War, Giles translation with intro and comments, posted by Korea Web Weekly
- Sun Tzu's The Art of War, with explanation of each Chinese character
- New translation of Sun Tzu, posted at Sonshi.com
- Sun Tzu and the Art of Business homepage, "the business strategist's headquarters"
- The 36 Strategems or Strategies of Ancient China
- See Ancient Military History, especially Peloponnesian War
and Alexander references
- The Battle of Marathon
or What’s a 2500-year-old battle got to do with me?, by MajGen I.B. Holley, in AU Review
- Thucydides and PME: History's Role in Intermediate and Senior Service School, by Rynecki, in Air & Space Power Chronicles
- See Ancient Military History
- Military Commentaries, by Gaius Julius Caesar
- The Military Institutions of the Romans (De Re Militari), by Flavius Vegetius Renatus, 390 A.D., translated by Clarke, 1767
- The Military Affairs of Ancient Rome & Roman Art of War in Caesar's Time, by Brady
Niccolo Machiavelli, 1469-1527
- The Prince, by Niccolo Machiavelli
- The Art of War [two sources]
- The Art of War, by Niccolo Machiavelli
- The Seven Books on the Art of War, by Niccolo Machiavelli, Citizen and Secretary of Florence, 1520
- Machiavelli's influence on Clausewitz mentioned in Clausewitz: Eastern and Western Approaches to War, by Col Harry Summers, in Air University Review, Mar-Apr 1986
- from Westenhoff quotes book
- Saxe, Hermann Maurice de, Marshal of France. Commissioned at age 12, a regimental commander of cavalry at 17; leading military commander of the early eighteenth century; author of My Reveries (1732).
- "The ultimate object of mobility is to obtain superior power in battle."
- "Few orders are best, but they should be followed up with care."
- Saxe, Hermann Maurice de, Marshal of France. Commissioned at age 12, a regimental commander of cavalry at 17; leading military commander of the early eighteenth century; author of My Reveries (1732).
- other quotes
- It is not big armies that win battles, it is the good ones.
- Hope encourages men to endure and attempt everything; in depriving them of it, or in making it too distant, you deprive them of their very soul.
- Maurice de Saxe, "My Reveries upon the Art of War," in Roots of Strategy: The 5 Greatest Military Classics of all Time, ed. and trans. Thomas R. Phillips, (Harrisburg, PA: Military Service Publishing Company, 1940; reprinted by Stackpole Books, 1985),
- I do not favor pitched battles, especially at the beginning of a war, and I am convinced that a skillful general could make war all his life without being forced into one.
- I do not mean to say by this that when an opportunity occurs to crush the enemy that he should not be attacked, nor that advantage should not be taken of his mistakes. But I do mean that war can be made without leaving anything to chance. And this is the highest point of perfection and skill in a general.
- from Westenhoff quotes book
- Frederick II ("the Great"), King of Prussia. Brilliant military leader and domestic reformer; rebelled against military discipline as a youth and was court-martialed; in the Seven Years' War of 1756-1763, he held off the armies of Russia, France, and Austria (all larger powers) through adroit maneuvering, timing, and skill.
- "Every art has its rules and maxims. One must study them: theory facilitates practice. The lifetime of one man is not long enough to enable him to acquire perfect knowledge and experience."
- "It would further human knowledge if, instead of writing new books, we would apply ourselves to making decent extracts from those that are already in existence. Then one would hope to avoid wasting his time by reading."
- "The greatest secret of war and the masterpiece of a skillful general is to starve his enemy."
- "In order to have rest oneself it is necessary to keep the enemy occupied."
- "Petty geniuses attempt to hold everything; wise men hold fast to the key points."
- "Skepticism is the mother of security."
- "But since the best dispositions become useless if they are not executed, it is essential that the general should be industrious in seeing whether his orders are executed or not."
- Frederick II ("the Great"), King of Prussia. Brilliant military leader and domestic reformer; rebelled against military discipline as a youth and was court-martialed; in the Seven Years' War of 1756-1763, he held off the armies of Russia, France, and Austria (all larger powers) through adroit maneuvering, timing, and skill.
- from Westenhoff quotes book
- Napoleon Bonaparte, Emperor of France. Military leader; multiskilled reorganizer of continental European politics and law.
- "If I always appear prepared, it is because before entering on an undertaking, I have meditated for long and have foreseen what may occur. It is not genius which reveals to me suddenly and secretly what I should do in circumstances unexpected by others; it is thought and preparation."
- "Strategy is the art of making use of time and space. Space we can recover; lost time, never."
- "War is composed of nothing but accidents, and though holding to general principles, a general should never lose sight of everything to enable him to profit from these accidents; that is the mark of genius."
- "A battle sometimes decides everything; and sometimes the most trifling thing decides the fate of a battle."
- "Fumblings, the middle course, lose all in war."
- "Nothing is more important in war than unity in command."
- "The whole art of war consists of a well-reasoned and extremely circumspect defensive followed by rapid and audacious attack."
- "The first quality for a commander-in-chief is a cool head, which receives a correct impression of things. He should not allow himself to be confused by either good or bad news."
- "Morale makes up three quarters of the game, the relative balance of manpower accounts for only the remaining quarter."
- Napoleon Bonaparte, Emperor of France. Military leader; multiskilled reorganizer of continental European politics and law.
- The Military Maxims of Napoleon, by General Burnod, 1827
- The Human Element and Air Combat: some Napoleonic Comparisons, by Wells, in Aerospace Power Journal, Spring 1988
- see Westenhoff quotes book and search on Clausewitz to see excellent selection of quotes
- see center of gravity
- Who Is Afraid of Carl von Clausewitz? A Guide to the Perplexed, by Handel, Naval War College
- Clausewitz for Beginners, by Cannon, in Airpower Journal
- Can Reading Clausewitz Save Us from Future Mistakes?, by Fleming, in Parameters, Spring 2004
- Quotations from Clausewitz (see quotes from Clausewitz)
- Tactics teaches the use of armed forces in the engagement; strategy, the use of engagements for the object of the war.
- In tactics the means are the fighting forces . . . the end is victory.
- The original means of strategy is victory -- that is, tactical success; its ends . . . are those objects which will lead directly to peace.
- Strategy . . . confers a special significance . . . on the engagement: it assigns a particular aim to it.
- Strategy is the use of the engagement for the purpose of the war. The strategist must therefore define an aim for the entire operational side of the war that will be in accordance with its purpose. . . . The aim will determine the series of actions intended to achieve it.
- In war more than anywhere else things do not turn out as we expect. . . . Perseverance in the chosen course is the essential counterweight.
- On War online, 1873 translation by Graham, posted at the Clausewitz Homepage
- On War online, 1873 translation by Graham, posted at Sonshi.com
- Principles of War, by Carl von Clausewitz, full text
- Echevarria
- Borrowing from the Master: Uses of Clausewitz in German Military Literature before the Great War, by Echevarria, in War and History - includes extensive discussion of Colonel Sigismund von Schlichting and his impact on German doctrine
- A Balkan Sun Tzu vs. the NATO Clausewitz: A Tentative Interpretation of the Serbo - NATO War
- Some Thoughts on Clausewitz and Airplanes, by Smith, Air University Review, May-Jun 1986
- Clausewitz: Eastern and Western Approaches to War, by Col Harry Summers, in Air University Review, Mar-Apr 1986
- The Clausewitz Homepage, lots of stuff
- By-Concept Index to On War, from SAMS
- John Keegan and the Grand Tradition of Trashing Clausewitz, article from War and History, Nov 1994
- Who Is Afraid of Carl von Clausewitz? A Guide to the Perplexed, by Handel, Naval War College
- Doctrinal Complexity: Nonlinearity in Marine Corps Doctrine, by Bassford, in Maneuver Warfare Science
- A Wake for Clausewitz: Toward a Philosophy of 21st-Century Warfare, by Metz, in Parameters
- Clausewitz: Toward a Theory of Applied Strategy, by Echevarria, in Defense Analysis
- English-Language Bibliography on Clausewitz
- Clausewitz, Nonlinearity and the Unpredictability of War, by Beyerchen, in International Security
- Clausewitz and the Indirect Approach ... Misreading the Leader, by Davidson, in Airpower Journal
- Clausewitz's Theory: On War and Its Application Today, by New, in Airpower Journal
- AU Library Bibliography on Clausewitz
- Jomini and Clausewitz: Their Interaction, by Bassford, paper from meeting of Consortium on Revolutionary Europe, Ga. St. U.
- See individual theorists, especially Clausewitz above and Warden below
- Definitions
- centers of gravity - (DOD Dictionary) Those characteristics, capabilities, or sources of power from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. Also called COGs. See also capability; decisive point.
- capability - (DOD Dictionary) The ability to execute a specified course of action. (A capability may or may not be accompanied by an intention.)
- decisive point - (DOD Dictionary) A geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an adversary or contribute materially to achieving success. See also center of gravity.
JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning - Center of Gravity is in Chapter IV, on pages IV-8 (pdf page 132) thru IV-19 - key terms, diagrams, and discussion of how to analyze COGs and integrate them into planning, ...
- A COG can be viewed as the set of characteristics, capabilities, and sources of power from which a system derives its moral or physical strength, freedom of action, and will to act. The COG is always linked to the objective. If the objective changes, the center of gravity also could change.
- key terms
- critical capability — a means that is considered a crucial enabler for a center of gravity to function as such, and is essential to the accomplishment of the specified or assumed objective(s).
- critical requirement — an essential condition, resource, and means for a critical capability to be fully operational.
- critical vulnerability — an aspect of a critical requirement, which is deficient or vulnerable to direct or indirect attack that will create decisive or significant effects.
- Understanding Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities
by Dr Joe Strange, USMC War College, and Colonel Richard Iron, UK Army- Summary of the article [PDF]
- Part 1, What Clausewitz (Really) Meant by Center of Gravity [PDF]
- Part 2, The CG-CC-CR-CV Construct: A Useful Tool to Understand and Analyze the Relationship between Centers of Gravity and their Critical Vulnerabilities [PDF]
- About the Authors [PDF]
- Echevarria
- “Reining in” the Center of Gravity Concept, by Echevarria, in Air & Space Power Journal, Summer 2003
- Systemizing Effect Based Air Operations, by Noedskov, in Air & Space Power Chronicles -- analysis aimed at CoG
- see also tipping point
- culminating point - (DOD) The point at which a force no longer has the capability to continue its form of operations, offense or defense. a. In the offense, the point at which continuing the attack is no longer possible and the force must consider reverting to a defensive posture or attempting an operational pause. b. In the defense, the point at which counteroffensive action is no longer possible. (from the DoD Dictionary)
- other military references to "culminating point"
- See also decisive force
- decisive engagement - (DOD Dictionary) In land and naval warfare, an engagement in which a unit is considered fully committed and cannot maneuver or extricate itself. In the absence of outside assistance, the action must be fought to a conclusion and either won or lost with the forces at hand.
- decisive point - (DOD Dictionary) A geographic place, specific key event, critical system, or function that allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an enemy and greatly influence the outcome of an attack. See also centers of gravity.
- Air University posted materials with reference to Clausewitz and "decisive battle"
- other military references to "decisive battle", historical, theoretical, and modern
- from Westenhoff quotes book
- Jomini, Antoine Henri, General of Brigade of France and Lieutenant General of Russia. Served as Marshal Ney's chief of staff; director of the French general staff's historical section in the Napoleonic Wars; author of The Art of War (1855).
- The Present State of Military Theory and Its Utility, by Jomini, 1838 - Jomini discusses almost all the military writers of the period
- Of all theories on the art of war, the only reasonable one is that which, founded upon the study of military history, admits a certain number of regulating principles, but leaves to natural genius the greatest part in the general conduct of a war without trammeling it with exclusive rules.
- On the contrary, nothing is better calculated to kill natural genius and to cause error to triumph, than those pedantic theories, based upon the false idea that war is a positive science, all the operations of which can be reduced to infallible calculations.
- In all the arts, as in all the situations of life, knowledge and skill are two altogether different things, and if one often succeed through the latter alone, it is never but the union of the two that constitutes a superior man and assures complete success. Meanwhile, in order not to be accused of pedantry, I hasten to avow that, by knowledge, I do not mean a vast erudition; it is not the question to know a great deal but to know well; to know especially what relates to the mission appointed us.
To recapitulate, the art of war consists of six distinct parts:—
- Statesmanship in its relation to war.
- Strategy, or the art of properly directing masses upon the theater of war, either for defense or for invasion.
- Grand Tactics.
- Logistics, or the art of moving armies.
- Engineering,—the attack and defense of fortifications.
- Minor Tactics.
- It is proposed to analyze the principal combinations of the first four branches, omitting the consideration of tactics and of the art of engineering.
- Familiarity with all these parts is not essential in order to be a good infantry, cavalry, or artillery officer; but for a general, or for a staff officer, this knowledge is indispensable.
- Jomini, Antoine Henri, AU Library resources
- Cornell University Making of America (MoA) Collection (300+ hits when searched on "Jomini") Using advanced search can find the following:
- Baron de Jomini's Treatise on Military Operations, 1865
- He said that it was while studying the accounts of the battle of Leuthen that the great principle which is the foundation of the art of war flashed upon him; and a careful study of Napoleon's early Italian campaigns proved to him that he had at last mastered the secret. ... it was simply this -- to bring the greatest mass of troops to bear upon the decisive point of a field of battle or theatre of operations, at the opportune moment.
- Not long after [Austerlitz], the Emperor [Napoleon], when at Schönbrunn, with more leisure than usual, directed Maret to read to him the portions of the work ["Treatise on Great Operations"] indicated in Jomini's letter. After listening to a few pages, he exclaimeed:
"They say the age does not advance! Why, here is a young major, a Swiss at that, who teaches us what my professors never taught me, and what very few generals understand!"
After hearing a little more, he said, much excited,
"Why did Fouché allow such a work to be published? It teaches my whole system of war to my enemies. The book must be seized, and its circulation prevented."
After a few moments' reflection, he again said:
"But I attach too much importance to this publication. The old generals who command against me will never read it, and the young men who will read it do not command; nevertheless, such works must not be published hereafter without permission."
He then ordered Jomini's name be placed on the list of promotions for the campaign, as colonel on the general staff; and he was immediately assigned as senior aide-de-camp to Marshal Ney. - Jomini conversed frankly about the modern changes and improvements in fire-arms, railways, telegraphs, etc. He freely acknowledged their advantages, and the changes they would bring about in war, but insisted that they could not modify its principles. "Woe to the general," said he, "who trusts in the modern inventions, and neglects the principles of strategy; those principles will remain unchanged through all the improvements of the future, and can never be inconsistent with them; future history will show that under no circumstances can those principles be violated with impunity."
- Baron de Jomini's Treatise on Military Operations, 1865
- Jomini and Clausewitz: Their Interaction, by Bassford, paper from meeting of Consortium on Revolutionary Europe, Ga. St. U.
- from Westenhoff quotes book
- Mahan, Dennis Hart. Professor of military art and science at West Point; founder of professional military study in the United States; influenced many Civil War generals.
- "Attack the enemy suddenly when he is not prepared to resist. Celerity is the secret of success."
- Mahan, Dennis Hart. Professor of military art and science at West Point; founder of professional military study in the United States; influenced many Civil War generals.
- McClellan, A Historian's View, with discussion of what he was taught by Professor D.H. Mahan at West Point -"It is doubtful that Professor Mahan ever had a more brilliant pupil than McClellan." -- "Professor Dennis Hart Mahan gave his students the practical lessons of the French Field Commander."
- Jomini and Clausewitz: Their Interaction, by Bassford ... "[A.T.] Mahan's father, military educator Dennis Hart Mahan, had been a devout Jominian, and so was he."
- "All officers of this command must now study their books; ignorance of duty must no longer be pleaded. The commanding general has the power at any time to order a board to examine the acquirements and capacity of any officer, and he will not fail to exercise it. Should any officer, high or low, after the opportunity and experiences we have had, be ignorant of his tactics, regulations, or even of the principles of the Art of War (Mahan and Jomini), it would be a lasting disgrace." By order of Maj. Gen. W. T. Sherman, from: HQ General Orders No.62 (24 July 1862)
- To do the greatest damage to our enemy with the least exposure to ourselves, is a military axiom lost sight of only by ignorance of the true ends of victory. --Dennis Hart Mahan
- 1826 Dennis Hart Mahan, highest ranking graduate in the U. S. Military Academy class of 1824, begins four years of study in France.
- 1830 Mahan becomes an instructor at USMA.
- The Battle of Gettysburg: A Historical Perspective, 1995 ACSC research project including an interactive Asymetrix Toolbook product
- "The Toolbook examines the influences of Dennis Hart Mahan and the concept of the decisive battle. Mahan derived his teachings from the works of the Swiss officer, Antoine Henri Jomini. The leaders of both the Northern and Southern armies and the overwhelming majority of their generals were graduates of the United States Military Academy, West Point. An overriding influence in their military education was the teachings of Dennis Hart Mahan, who taught for many years at West Point." -- training of the military leaders at Gettysburg "was dominated by the actions of Napoleon, the writings of Jomini, and formulated by the teachings of Mahan. The advantages of rapidity of movement, invasion of the enemy's territory, and a deadly blow to his forces culminating in a decisive battle, were the tenets that shaped the Civil War decision makers' thinking. They fought as they were trained to fight. A decisive battle was exactly what the generals were expecting and what they were seeking at Gettysburg."
- The History of Warfighting: Theory and Practice, Command and General Staff College -- "As the American Civil War progressed, most senior commanders continued to rely upon Jominian theory as interpreted by Dennis Hart Mahan and [Gen. Henry Wager] Halleck, even though it did not specifically address sweeping technological changes such as railroads and ironclad warships. A few commanders, like U. S. Grant, paid little attention to Jominian rules and adopted a more pragmatic approach that seemed to fit the changed conditions better than the Napoleonic model then in vogue."
- from Westenhoff quotes book
- du Picq, Charles Ardant, Colonel, French Army. Military leader in the Crimean and Franco-Prussian wars; author of the classic Battle Studies (1870).
- "With equal or inferior power of destruction he will win who has the resolution to advance, who by his formations and maneuvers can continually threaten his adversary with a new phase of material action, who, in a word, has the moral ascendancy."
- du Picq, Charles Ardant, Colonel, French Army. Military leader in the Crimean and Franco-Prussian wars; author of the classic Battle Studies (1870).
- Mahan's Forebears: the Debate over Maritime Strategy, 1868-1883, by Apt, in Naval War College Review
- from Westenhoff quotes book
- Mahan, Alfred Thayer, Admiral, USN. Son of Dennis Hart Mahan; naval historian and theorist; author of The Influence of Sea Power upon History (1890), one of the most influential volumes of historical analysis ever written.
- "The strategist is he who always keeps the objective of the war in sight and the objective of the war is never military and is always political."
- "The proverbial weakness of alliances is due to inferior power of concentration."
- Mahan, Alfred Thayer, Admiral, USN. Son of Dennis Hart Mahan; naval historian and theorist; author of The Influence of Sea Power upon History (1890), one of the most influential volumes of historical analysis ever written.
- Jomini and Clausewitz: Their Interaction, by Bassford ... "[A.T.] Mahan's father, military educator Dennis Hart Mahan, had been a devout Jominian, and so was he."
- Mahan's Classical View and the Profession of Arms, by Chipman, in AU Review, about the enduring lessons which may even apply to air power
- The Reluctant Seaman, about Alfred Thayer Mahan
- Mahan, Alfred Thayer, AU Library resources
- Mahan Articles, posted at the Cornell University Making of America (MoA) Collection (700+ hits when searched on "Mahan") Using advanced search you can find many articles, including the following:
- The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, unsigned review of Mahan's major work, Atlantic Monthly (Oct. 1890)
- The United States Looking Outward, by Alfred T. Mahan, in Atlantic Monthly (Dec. 1890)
- Admiral the Earl of St. Vincent, by Alfred T. Mahan, in Atlantic Monthly (March 1893)
- Admiral Saumarez, by Alfred T. Mahan, in Atlantic Monthly (May 1893)
- Admiral Lord Exmouth, by Alfred T. Mahan, in Atlantic Monthly (July 1893)
- The Isthmus and Sea Power, by Alfred T. Mahan, in Atlantic Monthly (Oct. 1893)
- Possibilities of an Anglo-American Reunion, by Alfred T. Mahan, in North American Review (Nov. 1894)
- Lessons from the Yalu Fight, by Alfred T. Mahan, in The Century (Aug. 1895)
- The Future in Relation to American Naval Power, by Alfred T. Mahan, in Harper's Magazine (Oct. 1895)
- Nelson at Cape St. Vincent, by Alfred T. Mahan, in The Century (Feb. 1896)
- The Engineer in Naval Warfare, by Alfred T. Mahan, in North American Review (Dec. 1896)
- Nelson in the Battle of the Nile, by Alfred T. Mahan, in The Century (Jan. 1897)
- The Battle of Copenhagen, by Alfred T. Mahan, in The Century (Feb. 1897)
- Nelson at Trafalgar, by Alfred T. Mahan, in The Century (March 1897)
- Preparedness for Naval War, by Alfred T. Mahan, in Harper's Magazine (March 1897)
- A Twentieth-Century Outlook, by Alfred T. Mahan, in Harper's Magazine (Sept. 1897)
- The Strategic Features of the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea, by Alfred T. Mahan, in Harper's Magazine (Oct. 1897)
- The Spanish Armada: Introduction, by Alfred T. Mahan, in The Century (June 1898)
- Current Fallacies Upon Naval Subjects, by Capt. Alfred T. Mahan, in Harper's Magazine (June 1898)
- The Peace Conference and the Moral Aspect of the War, by Alfred T. Mahan, in North American Review (Oct. 1899)
- The Merits of the Transvaal Dispute, by Alfred T. Mahan, in North American Review (March 1900)
- Effects of Asiatic Conditions Upon International Policies, by Alfred T. Mahan, in North American Review (Nov. 1900)
- Strategy in the Navy, 1909, by Spenser Wilkinson, an attack on Corbett's views/influence
- Corbett, Julian Stafford, AU Library resources
- The Military Policy of the United States from 1775, GPO 1904 (from 1878 manuscript), by Maj Gen Emory Upton
- Prophets or Praetorians? The Uptonian Paradox and the Powell Corollary, by Cassidy, in Parameters, Autumn 2003
-
"More than one generation of American military professionals have inherited and perpetuated Civil War Major General Emory Upton’s distrust of -- and disdain for -- civilians in general and politically elected or appointed civilian leaders in particular."
- from Westenhoff quotes book
- Moltke, Helmuth von ("The Elder"), Field Marshal of Germany. Twentieth-century strategist and military reformer whose military successes led to German unification; linguist and novelist.
- "You will usually find that the enemy has three courses open to him, and of these he will adopt the fourth ."
- "Remember, gentlemen, an order that can be misunderstood will be misunderstood."
- "The offensive knows what it wants, whereas the defensive is in a state of uncertainty." - S. T. Das paraphrasing Moltke, The Elder
- Moltke, Helmuth von ("The Elder"), Field Marshal of Germany. Twentieth-century strategist and military reformer whose military successes led to German unification; linguist and novelist.
- Moltke and the German Military Tradition: His Theories and Legacies, by Echevarria, in Parameters
- Anticipating the Future: New Perspectives on Prussian and Austrian War Planning, by Echevarria, in Parameters, review of works on 19th century strategy development, incl Moltke and Schlieffen
- Moltke listed Homer's works, the Bible, and On War among three of the five books which most influenced him. Eberhard Kessel, Moltke (Stuttgart: K.F. Koehler, 1957), 108 - [this from the notes to Echevarria's Borrowing from the Master: Uses of Clausewitz in German Military Literature Before the Great War ]
- see also Kipp article for Schlichting's influence on Russian/Soviet theorists and strategists
- Borrowing from the Master: Uses of Clausewitz in German Military Literature before the Great War, by Echevarria, in War and History - includes discussion "the Schlichting
controversy, at the core of which was the issue of the high casualty rates, especially among infantry and cavalry units, experienced in the Wars of Unification"
- - do a search on Schlichting to find the references to his influence on Russian doctrine
- - EXCELLENT discussion of impact by and influences on Leer, Svechin, Triandafillov, Tukhachevsky, and others who contributed to Russian/Soviet operational art, theory, and doctrine in this period
- from Westenhoff quotes book
- Douhet, Giulio, General, Italian Air Force. Early aviator and air power advocate; author of The Command of the Air (1921) and Probable Aspects of a Future War (1928).
- "Because of its independence of surface limitations and its superior speed the airplane is the offensive weapon par excellence."
- "The guiding principle of bombing actions should be this: the objective must be destroyed completely in one attack, making further attack on the same target unnecessary."
- "In order to assure an adequate national defense, it is necessary--and sufficient--to be in a position in case of war to conquer the command of the air."
- "Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes in the character of war, not upon those who wait to adapt themselves after the changes occur."
- Douhet, Giulio, General, Italian Air Force. Early aviator and air power advocate; author of The Command of the Air (1921) and Probable Aspects of a Future War (1928).
- Giulio Douhet: More on Target Than He Knew, by Estes, in Airpower Journal
- Reflections on Douhet: the classic approach, by Shiner, in AU Review
- Giulio Douhet and Strategic Air Force Operations, by Eula, in AU Review
- Giulio Douhet: Father of Air Power 1869 - 1930, a short biography -- part of "Italy at War, 1940-1943"
- Douhet, Giulio, AU Library resources
- from Westenhoff quotes book
- Trenchard, Hugh Montague, British Air Marshal, Viscount. Commander of the Royal Flying Corps in the field in World War I; chief of Air Staff from 1919 to 1929; single-minded advocate of air progress.
- "It may be said that Douhet was the theorist of air power, Mitchell the publicist and catalytic agent, and Trenchard the organizational genius." - Harry H. Ransom
- "The four principles of air power that I set out were:"
- To obtain mastery of the air, and to keep it, which means continually fighting for it.
- To destroy the enemy's means of production and his communications by strategic bombing.
- To maintain the battle without any interference by the enemy.
- To prevent the enemy being able to maintain the battle.
- Trenchard, Hugh Montague, British Air Marshal, Viscount. Commander of the Royal Flying Corps in the field in World War I; chief of Air Staff from 1919 to 1929; single-minded advocate of air progress.
- William "Billy" Mitchell's Air Power, words of Mitchell, published by the Airpower Research Institute
- Billy Mitchell, brief bio and review of ideas
- Mitchell, William (Billy), AU Library resources
- See also Between the Wars on the History page
- Air Warfare, by William Sherman, 1926
- The Thread of Doctrine, by Pauly, in Air University Review, May-June 1976 - discusses ACTS and its predecessors, as well as the documents of the period
- The basic documents produced during this period that reflected the evolution of these early ideas include:
- War Department Training Regulation No. 440-15, "Fundamental Principles for Employment of the Air Service" (1926)
- Air Corps Tactical School, "Employment of Combined Air Force" (1926)
- War Department Training Regulation No. 440-15, "Employment of the Air Forces of the Army" (1935)
- WDFM 1-5, "Employment of the Aviation of the Army" (1940)
- AWPD-1, "Munitions Requirements of the Army Air Forces" (1941)
- FM 31-35, "Aviation in Support of Ground Forces" (1942)
- WDFM 100-20, "Command and Employment of Air Power" (1943) - superseded FM 1-5
- The basic documents produced during this period that reflected the evolution of these early ideas include:
- Warden and the Air Corps Tactical School: What Goes Around Comes Around, by Belote, for Airpower Journal
- Warden and the Air Corps Tactical School: Déjà Vu?, by West, SAAS paper, Oct 1999
- The Development of US Strategic Bombing Doctrine in the Interwar Years: Moral and Legal?, by Faber, in Journal of Legal Studies, 1996/1997
- Regarding Employment of Combined Air Force, Air Service Tactical School, 1924-1925
- The text provides a series of working propositions that establish an intellectual foundation for the follow-on work of the ACTS Bomber Mafia from roughly 1928-1935. In particular, the Combined Air Force text codified five crucial propositions of air warfare for Army airmen.
1) The goal of an air attack is "to undermine the enemy’s morale, [or] his will to resist."
2) Airmen can best destroy morale, however, by attacking the interior of an opponent’s territory. Attacks against vital points or centers will not only terrorize populations into submission, they will also save lives. (In the future, for example, the Army will not have to gradually wear down and overcome enemy forces interposed between itself and an opponent’s territory.)
3) Air power is an inherently offensive weapon that is impossible, in absolute terms, to stop.
4) Since air power is the only military tool that can hit centers of concentration and sources of supply, and since it is the only tool that can undermine national morale with minimum effort and materiel, combatants should use it extensively in strategic operations. Strategic targets, after all, are typically more important than tactical ones.
5) Last, "In any scheme of strategical operations the object is to cause complete destruction or permanent and irreparable damage to the enemy which will have a decisive effect."
- The text provides a series of working propositions that establish an intellectual foundation for the follow-on work of the ACTS Bomber Mafia from roughly 1928-1935. In particular, the Combined Air Force text codified five crucial propositions of air warfare for Army airmen.
- Regarding Employment of Combined Air Force, Air Service Tactical School, 1924-1925
- In 1946, in a conversation with General Raoul Salan of France, Vo Nguyen Giap reportedly informed him, "My fighting gospel is T.E. Lawrence's Seven Pillars of Wisdom. I am never without it."
- Principles of Warfare Culminating Seminar, by Schneider, 13 Apr 2005, School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) - quick summary of Lawrence's ideas and their application today
- Twenty-Seven Articles, by Lawrence, reprinted from The Arab Bulletin, 20 August 1917, reproduced in Advice for Advisors: Suggestions and Observations from Lawrence to the Present - see PDF page 11
- from his book Seven Pillars of Wisdom (various editions during the 1920's and 1930's) .. [red highlight added by AWC]
- "However it was, things in the Hejaz went from bad to worse. No proper liaison was provided for the Arab forces in the field, no military information was given the Sherifs, no tactical advice or strategy was suggested, no attempt made to find out the local conditions and adapt existing Allied resources in material to suit their needs."
- "As I have shown, I was unfortunately as much in command of the campaign as I pleased, and was untrained. In military theory I was tolerably read, my Oxford curiosity having taken me past Napoleon to Clausewitz and his school, to Caemmerer and Moltke, and the recent Frenchmen. They had all seemed to be one-sided; and after looking at Jomini and Willisen, I had found broader principles in Saxe and Guibert and the eighteenth century. However, Clausewitz was intellectually so much the master of them, and his book so logical and fascinating, that unconsciously I accepted his finality, until a comparison of Kuhne and Foch disgusted me with soldiers, wearied me of their officious glory, making me critical of all their light. In any case, my interest had been abstract, concerned with the theory and philosophy of warfare especially from the metaphysical side."
- "Here was a pompous, professorial beginning. My wits, hostile to the abstract, took refuge in Arabia again. Translated into Arabic, the algebraic factor would first take practical account of the area we wished to deliver, and I began idly to calculate how many square miles: sixty: eighty: one hundred: perhaps one hundred and forty thousand square miles. And how would the Turks defend all that? No doubt by a trench line across the bottom, if we came like an army with banners; but suppose we were (as we might be) an influence, an idea, a thing intangible, invulnerable, without front or back, drifting about like a gas? Armies were like plants, immobile, firm-rooted, nourished through long stems to the head. We might be a vapour, blowing where we listed. Our kingdoms lay in each man's mind; and as we wanted nothing material to live on, so we might offer nothing material to the killing. It seemed a regular soldier might be helpless without a target, owning only what he sat on, and subjugating only what, by order, he could poke his rifle at."
- The Evolution of a Revolt, by Lawrence, in Army Quarterly and Defence Journal, Oct 1920 - with mention of Foch, Saxe, Moltke, Hannibal, Mohammed, and others .. [red highlight added by AWC]
- Tactically the only campaigns I had studied step by step were the ancient affairs of Hannibal and Belisarius, Mohammed and the Crusades! My interests were only in pure theory and I looked everywhere for the metaphysical side, the philosophy of war, about which I thought a little for some years. Now I was compelled suddenly to action, to find an immediate equation between my book-reading and our present movements.
- While we were training the regulars (of course not sending officer or light machine guns to Feisal in the hills meanwhile), the Turks suddenly put my appreciation to the test by beginning their advance on Mecca. They broke through my "impregnable" hills in twenty-four hours, and came forward from them towards Rabegh slowly. So they proved to us the second theorem of irregular war - namely, that irregular troops are as unable to defend a point or line as they are to attack it.
- My own personal duty was command, and I began to unravel command and analyse it, both from the point of view of strategy, the aim in war, the synoptic regard which sees everything by the standard of the whole, and from the point of view called tactics, the means towards the strategic end, the steps of its staircase. In each I found the same elements, one algebraical, one biological, a third psychologicaL
- The third factor in command seemed to be the psychological, that science (Xenophon called it diathetic) of which our propaganda is a stained and ignoble part. Some of it concerns the crowd, the adjustment of spirit to the point where it becomes fit to exploit in action, the prearrangement of a changing opinion to a certain end. Some of it deals with individuals, and then it becomes a rare art of human kindness, transcending, by purposeful emotion, the gradual logical sequence of our minds. It considers the capacity for mood of our men, their complexities and mutability, and the cultivation of what in them profits the intention. We had to arrange their minds in order of battle, just as carefully and as formally as other officers arranged their bodies: and not only our own men's minds, though them first: the minds of the enemy, so far as we could reach them: and thirdly, the mind of the nation supporting us behind the firing-line, and the mind of the hostile nation waiting the verdict, and the neutrals looking on.
- It was the ethical in war, and the process on which we mainly depended for victory on the Arab front. The printing press is the greatest weapon in the armoury of the modern commander.... In Asia we were so weak physically that we could not let the metaphysical weapon rust unused. We had won a province when we had taught the civilians in it to die for our ideal of freedom: the presence or absence of the enemy was a secondary matter.
- It was an irony of fate to entrust this side-show of a side-show, with its opportunity of proving or disproving the theory, to an outsider like myself, not qualified technically to make the best of it. I would have given so much to show that Saxe was the greatest master of his kind of war, but now all I can say is that we worked by his light for two years, and the work stood. This is a pragmatic argument that cannot be wholly derided.
- The experiment was a thrilling one, which took all our wits. We believed we would prove irregular war or rebellion to be an exact science, and an inevitable success, granted certain factors and if pursued along certain lines. We did not prove it, because the war stopped: but here the thesis is:-
- It seemed that rebellion must have an unassailable base, something guarded not merely from attack, but from the fear of it: such a base as we had in the Red Sea Ports, the desert, or in the minds of the men we converted to our creed.
- It must have a sophisticated alien enemy, in the form of a disciplined army of occupation too small to fulfil the doctrine of acreage: too few to adjust number to space, in order to dominate the whole area effectively from fortified posts.
- It must have a friendly population, not actively friendly, but sympathetic to the point of not betraying rebel movements to the enemy. Rebellions can be made by 2 per cent. active in a striking force, and 98 per cent. passively sympathetic. The few active rebels must have the qualities of speed and endurance, ubiquity and independence of arteries of supply. They must have the technical equipment to destroy or paralyse the enemy's organized communications, for irregular war is fairly Willisen's definition of strategy, "the study of communication" in its extreme degree, of attack where the enemy is not.
- In fifty words: Granted mobility, security (in the form of denying targets to the enemy), time, and doctrine (the idea to convert every subject to friendliness), victory will rest with the insurgents, for the algebraical factors are in the end decisive, and against them perfections of means and spirit struggle quite in vain.
- from Westenhoff quotes book
- Liddell Hart, Sir Basil Henry, Captain, British Army. Military theorist and historian; advocate of combined arms warfare and the indirect approach; author of numerous books, including Paris, or the Future of War (1925) and Strategy (1954).
- "A modern state is such a complex and interdependent fabric that it offers a target highly sensitive to a sudden and overwhelming blow from the air."
- "Air power is, above all, a psychological weapon--and only short-sighted soldiers, too battle-minded, underrate the importance of psychological factors in war."
- "Loss of hope, rather than loss of life, is the factor that really decides wars, battles, and even the smallest combats."
- "War and truth have a fundamental incompatibility."
- "While the horizon of strategy is bounded by war, grand strategy looks beyond the war to the subsequent peace."
- "True economy of force is using the indirect approach to effect a psychological defeat without engaging in actual combat."
- "To strike with strong effect, one must strike at weakness."
- "If the enemy is certain as to your point of aim he has the best possible chance of guarding himself-and blunting your weapon. If, on the other hand, you take a line that threatens alternative objectives, you distract his mind and forces."
- "Originality is the most vital of all military virtues as two thousand years of history attest."
- "The principles of war could, for brevity, be condensed into a single word: concentration."
- Liddell Hart, Sir Basil Henry, Captain, British Army. Military theorist and historian; advocate of combined arms warfare and the indirect approach; author of numerous books, including Paris, or the Future of War (1925) and Strategy (1954).
- Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King's College London, incl how to use the centre
- Liddell Hart, Basil Henry, AU Library resources
- Clausewitz and the Indirect Approach… Misreading the Leader, by Davison, in Aerospace Power Journal, Winter 1988 - discusses Liddell Hart's attack on Clausewitz
- additional references to Liddell Hart and the indirect approach
Mao Tse-tung or Mao Zedong, 1893-1976
- Mao Zedong Reference Archive
- Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung
- [selected] Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-Tung, with commentary, posted at Washington State University
- Compound Warfare in the Military Thought and Practice of Mao Zedong and the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s Huai Hai Campaign (November 1948-January 1949), by Bjorge, Combat Studies Institute
- Heeding Sun or Mao? Assessing China's Military Thinking, by Halloran, Global Beat, NYU
- Flawed icon of China's resurgence, CNN profile of Mao Tse-tung (1893-1976)
- Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung, with a history of the work and its impact, by Ferguson, at Princeton U.
- Mao's 1928 formula of 16 Chinese characters
- when the enemy advances, we retreat; when he camps, we harass him; if he tires, we attack; when he retreats, we pursue
- Guerrilla Warfare, by Ernesto "Che" Guevara, written in 1961 - posted at the Small Wars Center of Excellence
- Che Guevara on Guerrilla Warfare, by Ernesto Guevara, Frederick A. Praeger Publisher, 1961
- Ryan, Henry Butterfield. The Fall of Che Guevara: a story of soldiers, spies, and diplomats. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.
- Mary-Alice Waters
- Edited volumes containing Ernesto Che Guevara's essays and field notes from the Cuban (1957-1959) and Bolivian (1967) campaigns
- The Bolivian Diary of Ernesto Che Guevara (1994) and
- Episodes of the Cuban Revolutionary War, 1956-58 (1996)
- Edited volumes containing Ernesto Che Guevara's essays and field notes from the Cuban (1957-1959) and Bolivian (1967) campaigns
- Giap, Nguyen Vo. How We Won The War. Philadelphia: Recon Publications, 1995.
- Currey, Cecil B. Victory at Any Cost: The Genius of Viet Nam’s Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap. Washington: Brassey’s, Inc., , 1997.
[book review in Air Power Chronicles]- from Chapter Eleven
- And he learned from Ho the need for perseverance.
- So also did Giap learn from Communist Party theorists, most importantly from Mao Tse-tung and Lenin. From Lenin, Giap came to understand that the goal toward which one strives is much more important than the means one uses to achieve it. Both followers and their welfare could be sacrificed without hesitation if by so doing one furthered the revolutionary struggle.
- Giap learned the value of the ideas of Karl von Clausewitz, who also insisted on the close relationship between politics and armed struggle.
- Giap also studied carefully the writings of Mao Tse-tung, then the foremost philosopher of people's wars. Mao believed that all of life was governed by uniform and unchanging laws.
- Although the similarity of Sun Tzu's doctrine to those developed by Giap is plain, when asked if he had been influenced by the aphorisms in The Art of War, Giap replied, "Sun Tzu has interesting ideas. I once studied him and found that he said that ... if enemy forces are ten times larger, then we should not fight. If I had followed him we would still be in the jungle."
- In 1946, in a conversation with General Raoul Salan of France, Giap reportedly informed him, "My fighting gospel is T.E. Lawrence's Seven Pillars of Wisdom. I am never without it."
- ... Lawrence noted ... "Rebellions can be made by 2 per cent active in a striking force and 98 per cent passively sympathetic."
- from Chapter Eleven
- from Westenhoff quotes book
- Brodie, Bernard. Eminent strategic thinker; father of nuclear deterrence theory; author of numerous books, including the classics Strategy in the Missile Age (1959) and War and Politics (1973).
- "Air power had a mighty vindication in World War II. But it was Mitchell's conception of it--anything that flies--rather than Douhet's that was vindicated."
- "Soldiers usually are close students of tactics, but rarely are they students of strategy and practically never of war."
- "Deterrence now means something as a strategic policy only when we are fairly confident that the retaliatory instrument on which it relies will not be called to function at all."
- "In wars throughout history, events have generally proved the pre-hostilities calculations of both sides, victor as well as loser, to have been seriously wrong."
- "The bias toward the offensive creates special problems in any technologically new situation where there is little or no relevant war experience to help one reach a balanced judgment."
- Brodie, Bernard. Eminent strategic thinker; father of nuclear deterrence theory; author of numerous books, including the classics Strategy in the Missile Age (1959) and War and Politics (1973).
- The Essential Boyd, by Grant T. Hammond, Boyd biographer
- Boyd and Military Theory, includes Discourse on Winning and Losing, at Defense and the National Interest website
- From Air Force Fighter Pilot to Marine Corps Warfighting: Colonel John Boyd, His Theories on War, and Their Unexpected Legacy, USMC Command and Staff College Research Paper
- A Swift, Elusive Sword: What If Sun Tzu and John Boyd Did a National Defense Review, by Richards, at CDI
- War, Chaos, and Business, includes excerpts from John Boyd, Chet Richards, and others
- Destruction and Creation, by John R. Boyd, excerpts
- Essence of Winning and Losing, by John R. Boyd, including OODA loop
- A Discourse on Winning and Losing, by John R. Boyd
- Organic Design for Command and Control, by John R. Boyd
- Categories of Conflict, by John R. Boyd
- Patterns for Successful Operations, by John R. Boyd
- Boyd on Clausewitz
- Boyd, Metcalfe and Amdahl - Modelling Networked Warfighting Systems, presentation by Kopp, Monash University - includes discussion of combining Metcalfe's Law, of exponential improvement in power, with the limiting effect of Amdahl's Law
- Marine generals and colonels vs futures traders in decisionmaking wargame
- "The traders' OODA loop, executed at much higher speed, is ISAA: Information, Sort by Priority, Act, Assess"
- Hierarchical Interactive Theater Model (HITM): an Investigation into the Relationship between Strategic Effects and OODA Loops, by Bullock, AFIT research paper
- Strategic Effects of Airpower and Complex Adaptive Agents: an Initial Investigation, by Tighe, AFIT research paper - includes OODA discussion
- Manipulating the OODA Loop: the Overlooked Role of Information Resource Management in Information Warfare, by Schechtman, AFIT research paper
- The OODA Loop and application in UIT Cognitive Engineering
- Defining Air and Space Power, by Baner, at Air Chronicles, Mar 99, includes extensive discussion of the OODA loop as a way of examining and defining air and space strategy
- USMC MCDP 6, Chapter 2 Command and Control Theory, with the OODA Loop as a point of departure
- AirLand Battle Doctrine - a selected bibliography, by USAMHI
- The Evolution of the Airland Battle Concept, by Romjue, in Air University Review, May-June 1984
- Romjue, John L. "AirLand Battle: The Historical Background." Military Review, Mar 1986, pp. 52-55
- Galloway, Archie. "FM 100-5: Who Influenced Whom?" Military Review, Mar 1986, pp. 46-51 - discusses the combined influences of Clauswitz, Jomini, and Sun Tzu on the 1982 manual
- Airland Battle: The Wrong Doctrine for The Wrong Reason, by Powell, Ira C. Eaker Essay, in Air University Review, May-June 1985
- Army Doctrine and Modern War: Notes Toward a New Edition of FM 100-5, by Kagan, in Parameters, Spring 1997
- AirLand Battle doctrine, epitomized by FM 100-5/1986, was and still is a very good doctrine for industrial age warfare. Had subsequent editions of FM 100-5 retained it and improved on it, the US Army might now have a sound basis for reviewing its core operational doctrine. Unfortunately, AirLand Battle became one of the casualties of the end of the Cold War; FM 100-5/1993 eliminated it in favor of a generalized doctrine which is antithetical to the key elements of AirLand Battle. The Army's most forward-looking doctrinal piece, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, has subsequently consigned AirLand Battle to the dustbin of history along with other legacies of the industrial age.
- Prophets or Praetorians? The Uptonian Paradox and the Powell Corollary, by Cassidy, in Parameters, Autumn 2003
- The Use of Force -- The Six Criteria Revisited, speech by Hon. Caspar W. Weinberger, at AFA Policy Forum, 14 Sep 1999
- Weinberger Doctrine, 1984 (as recounted in the above speech)
- First, the United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies.
- Second, if we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into a given situation, we should do so wholeheartedly, and with the clear intention of winning.
- Third, if we do decide to commit forces to combat overseas, we should have clearly defined political and military objectives.
- Fourth, the relationship between our objectives and the forces we have committed — their size, composition and disposition — must be continually reassessed and readjusted if necessary.
- Fifth, before the U.S. commits combat forces abroad, there must be some reasonable assurance we will have the support of the American people and their elected representatives in Congress.
- Finally, the commitment of U.S. forces to combat should be a last resort.
- Force-Protection Fetishism:
Sources, Consequences, and (?) Solutions, by Record, in Aerospace Power Journal, Summer 2000
- Force-protection fetishism is rooted in Vietnam—specifically in the resultant Weinberger-Powell Doctrine, which is the intellectual construct of the strategic lessons that many military professionals drew from the war. Caspar Weinberger, President Ronald Reagan’s secretary of defense, proposed six “tests” for using force, later amended by Gen Colin Powell’s emphasis on overwhelming force. These tests effectively deny the legitimacy of force as a tool of coercive diplomacy by restricting its use to circumstances involving clear and present threats to manifestly vital national interests
- Alan Ned Sabrosky and Robert L. Sloane, The Recourse to War: An Appraisal of the "Weinberger Doctrine," Carlisle, Pa.: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1988
- Warden vs Pape, by Bence, in Air & Space Power Chronicles
- The Enemy as a System, by Warden, for Airpower Journal - the Five-Ring Model
- We cannot think strategically if we start our thought process with individual aircraft, sorties, or weaponsor even with the enemy's entire military forces. Instead, we must focus on the totality of our enemy, then on our objectives, and next on what must happen to the enemy before our objectives become his objectives. When all of this is done rigorously, we can begin to think about how we are going to produce the desired effect on the enemy -- the weapons, the delivery systems, and other means we will use.
- As strategists and operational artists, we must rid ourselves of the idea that the central feature of war is the clash of military forces. In strategic war, a clash may well take place, but it is not always necessary, should normally be avoided, and is almost always a means to an end and not an end in itself.
- If we are going to think strategically, we must think of the enemy as a system composed of numerous subsystems. Thinking of the enemy in terms of a system gives us a much better chance of forcing or inducing him to make our objectives his objectives and doing so with minimum effort and the maximum chance of success.
- Air Theory for the Twenty-first Century, by Warden, in Battlefield of the Future
- Warden and the Air Corps Tactical School: What Goes Around Comes Around, by Belote, for Airpower Journal
- Warden and the Air Corps Tactical School: Déjà Vu?, by West, SAAS paper, Oct 1999
- The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat, by Warden, published in hard copy by NDU Press
- Electronic copy courtesy of Air War College Nonresident Studies.
- The Air Campaign, viewable by chapter, faster loading, includes front material
- The Air Campaign, single file (300 Kb), useful for word/phrase searches
- Warden vs Pape, by Bence, in Air & Space Power Chronicles
- The Changed Nature of Strategic Air Attack, by Conversino, in Parameters
-
"Strategic bombing doesn't matter." With that, Dartmouth political scientist Robert Pape dismissed an entire airpower mission as essentially irrelevant to contemporary, non-nuclear warfare.[1] His book, Bombing to Win, a comprehensive examination of the employment of "strategic" airpower, is, however, undermined by his reliance on a flawed and outdated paradigm. Pape continues to view "strategic" in obsolescent terms that relate to the platform employed or the target attacked. He is hardly alone in holding this view.
- Competing Theories of Airpower: a Language for Analysis, by Lt Col Faber
With the above goals in mind, let us look at a conceptual framework (and air-centered "language") that anyone can use to analyze multiple theories of airpower. The framework is the creation of Dr. Robert Pape, who deliberately attempts to link military means with political ends. ...
Question #1: according to Dr. Robert Pape and Colonel Pat "Doc" Pentland, USAF, all theorists must answer a key question before they begin air operations. Pape's question asks the following: should I adopt a punishment strategy, which tries to push a society beyond its economic and psychological breaking point, a denial strategy, which tries to neutralize an opponent's military ability to wage war, or a decapitation strategy, which destroys or isolates an opponent's leadership, national communications, or other politico-economic centers? (Note that punishment and denial strategies try to translate military effects into political change. A decapitation strategy, in contrast, does the opposite.)
- Making the Connection: An Air Strategy Analysis Framework, SAAS paper by Ehrhard
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This study analyzes and builds on Dr. Robert Pape’s framework for analyzing airpower strategies. The analysis shows the underlying value of his Targets and Timing, Mechanism, Outcomes construct as well as the considerable clarification and expansion it requires in order to perform comprehensive air strategy analysis for the broad range of strategic air and space tasks.
- The Mechanism for Strategic Coercion: Denial or Second Order Change?, SAAS paper by Sullivan
- from the abstract
- Two contemporary theories of strategic coercion seem to offer promising alternatives to brute force. First, Robert Pape’s Denial Theory is based on the assumption that states make decisions as if they are rational, unitary actors attempting to maximize the utility of their choices. Essentially, nations perform a cost-benefit evaluation to determine the best course of action. Theoretically, one may be able to coerce a target nation by raising the expected costs to a prohibitive level, but Pape advocates that this is generally ineffective in conventional conflicts. Instead, coercion requires that the target nation be denied the probability of achieving the sought-after benefits. Denial Theory proposes that the specific means for coercion is the opponent’s military vulnerability: defeating an opponent’s military strategy denies him the probability of achieving benefits and results in coercion.
- from the abstract
Huba Wass de Czege & Positive Ends strategy
- Biographical Sketch (from SSI)
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HUBA WASS DE CZEGE is a retired U.S. Army brigadier general. During his career as an infantry officer, he served two tours in Vietnam and gained staff experience at all levels up to assistant division commander. General Wass De Czege was a principal designer of the operational concept known as AirLand Battle. He also was the founder and first director of the Army’s School for Advanced Military Studies where he also taught applied military strategy. After retiring in 1993, General Wass De Czege became heavily involved in the Army After Next Project and served on several Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency v advisory panels. He is a 1964 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy and holds an MPA from Harvard University.
- Defense planners and strategists have recently proposed a variety of alternatives for America’s role in what many see as a dramatically different international situation. Most of those proposals, though, continue with a Cold War paradigm of trying to foresee what the next threat might be and how the United States might best prepare itself to respond to it. Consequently, the possibility of taking advantage of the intrinsic dynamism of the new security environment in order to create conditions that might promote positive ends-long-term peace, stability, and prosperity-has remained largely overlooked.
- The Psychology of Coercion: Merging Airpower and Prospect Theory, SAAS paper by Kimminau
- The Essence of Coercive Air Power: a Primer for Military Strategists, by Mueller, in Air & Space Power Chronicles
- The Role of Non-Lethal Airpower in Future Peace Operations - "Beyond Bombs on Target" by Elder, ACSC paper, Apr 2003
- The Politics of Coercion: Toward a Theory of Coercive Airpower for Post–Cold War Conflict, by Hinman, CADRE Paper No. 14, Aug 2002
- A Unified Field Theory of Coercive Airpower, by Walker, in Aerospace Power Journal, Summer 1997
- Sustained Coercive Air Presence: Provide Comfort, Deny Flight, and the Future of Airpower in Peace Enforcement, SAAS paper by Kramlinger, Feb 2001
- Small Wars, Big Stakes: Coercion, Persuasion, and Airpower in Counterrevolutionary War, SAAS paper by Brozenick, June 1998
- Beyond Gunboat Diplomacy: Forceful Applications of Airpower in Peace Enforcement Operations, SAAS paper by Tubbs, Sep 1997
- Coercive Air Strategy: Forcing a Bureaucratic Shift, SAAS paper by Pray, Jan 1995
- The Psychology of Coercion: Merging Airpower and Prospect Theory, SAAS paper by Kimminau, June 1998
- The Mechanism for Strategic Coercion: Denial or Second Order Change?, SAAS paper by Sullivan, Apr 1995
- The Myth of Air Control: Reassessing the History, by Corum, in Aerospace Power Journal, Winter 2000
- Project Control: creative strategic thinking at Air University, by Dean, in Air University Review, July-August 1984
- Psychologist wins Nobel Prize, by Smith, in Monitor on Psychology
The team's findings have countered some assumptions of traditional economic theory--that people make rational choices based on their self-interest--by showing that people frequently fail to fully analyze situations where they must make complex judgments. Instead, people often make decisions using rules of thumb rather than rational analysis, and they base those decisions on factors economists traditionally don't consider, such as fairness, past events and aversion to loss.
For example, they found that people's decisions can be swayed by how the situation is framed. When Kahneman and Tversky asked people to hypothetically decide what procedure to take to cure a disease, most preferred a procedure that saved 80 percent of people to one that killed 20 percent.
- more references on Prospect Theory, by Kahneman and Tversky
- operating environment of Volatility, Uncertainty, Complexity, and Ambiguity (VUCA)
- See also John Boyd section
- Chaos as Strategy, by Liotta, in Parameters, Summer 2002
- Complexity, Conflict Resolution, and How the Mind Works, by Jones and Hughes, in Conflict Resolution Quarterly, Summer 2003
- Chaos, Complexity and Conflict, by Weeks, in Air & Space Power Chronicles
- War, Chaos, and Business, includes excerpts from John Boyd, Chet Richards, and others
- Complex Targeting: a Complexity-Based Theory of Targeting and Its Application to Radical Islamic Terrorism, SAAS paper by Glenn
- Chaos Theory for the Practical Military Mind, AU research paper by Durham
- Marine generals and colonels vs futures traders in decisionmaking wargame
- "The traders' OODA loop, executed at much higher speed, is ISAA: Information, Sort by Priority, Act, Assess"